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Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to lay out some of the debates yet to be resolved 
surrounding the sexual rights of individuals during childhood and adolescence. This category of 
rights is one of the domains in which the shortcomings of current regulations designed to protect 
certain rights of minors and also the absence of a theoretical foundation for human rights for 
those phases of life are clearly manifested. The lack of a deep discussion on the rights of boys 
and girls becomes evident when the attempt is made to define sexual and reproductive rights, 
since while entitlement is sought in some respects – especially for certain reproductive rights for 
adolescents such as access to contraception – in other respects a continuing effort is made to 
justify limiting access for the same age group to related rights, the right to contract marriage 
being one example.1 
From my point of view one of the central issues is that of consent. Seriously addressing 
this point implies calling into question the criteria that until now have been used to distinguish 
between certain capacities of minors and adults, a task that very few people have undertaken and 
that, moreover, is considered irrelevant by the majority of theoreticians. For this reason a 
discussion of the legal limits of the rights and responsibilities of parents in the exercise of their 
parental powers will also be necessary.  
                                                            
1 In some documents, certain reproductive rights for adolescents are recognized while simultaneously governments 
are advised to take measures to prevent early marriages and the right to determine a child’s sexual education is also 
left to the parents, without any explanation of how these discrepancies which can conflict are justified or reconciled. 




Another problem related to the topic is found in the lack of a clear definition of the 
content and scope of so-called sexual rights. Frequently the term is used to exclusively designate 
reproductive rights, which were defined by the International Conference on Population and 
Development held in Cairo as follows: 
Reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national 
laws, international human rights documents and other relevant UN consensus documents. These 
rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and 
responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and 
means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. 
They also include the right of all to make decisions concerning reproduction free of 
discrimination, coercion and violence.  
The proposal here is to understand sexual rights in a broader fashion in that includes the 
interests from which these rights originate during childhood and adolescence, inasmuch as they 
reference basic necessities which must be guaranteed by efficient legal norms, especially when 
dealing with girls and boys. 
We will look for the origin of some of the underlying conceptions in history and employ 
an interdisciplinary vision which includes developmental psychology to argue for the necessity 
of protecting the sexual rights of girls and boys. We will also question whether differentiating on 
the basis of age concerning consent is justified in sexual matters but not in other spheres of life. 
Rights, childhood, and sexuality 
For several years now, sexuality has been considered a basic part of human life. Studies 




formulation of a series of rights which have yet to be completely delineated for international 
instruments: sexual and reproductive rights.2 This grouping of rights has even resulted in a series 
of social movements giving rise to demands from citizens for specific legislation, among which 
can be found establishing the right to decide for children, to access to contraception, to abortion, 
sexual freedom, etc.3  
Nonetheless, when we attempt to determine how these rights are exercised by children, or 
whether children are entitled to them, questions arise. Despite being recognized by international 
instruments – in basic form at least4 – and in the constitutions and laws of many states as 
universal rights, they are not understood as applying to girls and boys. This is one of the 
examples that illustrates how questionable the universal character of human rights is, since a 
good part of humanity are not entitled to them. What makes matters worse is that in the majority 
of cases, the restriction is not even explicit; that is, the right is articulated in general terms even 
though it is interpreted as excluding girls and boys.5 This lack of transparency complicates the 
matter, given the sense of “normality” and “naturalness” that comes across in this reading of 
rights. It sometimes appears that in the best of cases the sexual rights of minors ends in sexual 
education. 
                                                            
2 Reproductive rights are better defined and regulated, especially with regards birth control. Frequently, however, 
the two are confused and reproductive rights are treated as if they were the only sexual rights. From a broad 
conception of sexuality, the rights associated with it have dimensions that go beyond its merely reproductive 
function. 
3 Some authors even consider sexual rights as fourth generation rights, as conceptually they have yet to be fully 
articulated, although it is clear they belong to the classes of rights already recognized as first and second generation 
such as the right to personal freedom and the right to health. 
4 Among the rights that are already recognized by international instruments are the right to marry and start a family, 
and the right to control how many children to have and when. 
5 The same occurred with regards to the political rights of women in Mexico. Nothing explicitly prohibited them 
from voting or receiving votes for office, and nowhere was it even mentioned that only men were entitled to these 
rights, yet it was simply assumed that women could not participate in the political process. That is why, when 
Article 34 of the Constitution was reformed in 1953, women were expressly mentioned: All men and women 




One possible explanation identifies two underlying ideas: 
The first refers to the construction of the autonomous agent as the paradigmatic quality 
for entitlement. It is possible to identify this tendency going back to the first declarations of 
rights. The preeminent value is freedom and laws are made to prevent arbitrary incursions into 
this space.  Whoever does not fall into the category of autonomous agents is thus excluded: non-
citizens, women, children – but it does not stop here – as one of the rights of the adult-male-
landowner was precisely guaranteed protection for a sphere of private immunity which included 
his family.6  
In another sense, there appears to be a negative, restricted connotation of sexuality that 
accompanies a certain conception of childhood. The result is the understanding and regulating of 
sexual rights as belonging exclusively to the domain of the adult world, isolating childhood and 
thus articulating the rights in a totally inverse manner; that is, by guaranteeing non-access to 
them for children. An interesting example can be seen in how statutory rape7, that is, sexual 
relations with a person under a certain age, is categorized. Along the same lines, it is worth 
noting the international movement combating child marriages: the goal is the preservation of 
                                                            
6 During the 19th century in France, the father of a family could make use of the state prisons in instances of serious 
disobedience on the part of his child: Fathers who have serious reason to complain of the behavior of a child may 
appeal to the district court; the detention may not exceed one month for children under sixteen years old; from that 
age until the age of majority, the detention may last up to six months. The formalities – and the protections – are 
very limited: there is no written document or any legal formality, unless there is an order for arrest, where any 
mention of the reason for detention is made. If after release the child “strays anew,” detention can be prescribed 
once again. (Hunt, Lynn 1991, p. 129) 
7 In the Civil Code for Mexico City the age limit for statutory rape is set at 12 years: Article 175. Rape will be 
charged, carrying the same penalty, if: I. Sexual intercourse is carried out with a person under twelve years of age or 
with a person who does not have the capacity to understand the significance of the act or for any other reason is not 




sexual freedom and the freedom of choice, yet while for an adult woman these freedoms refer to 
her ability to freely choose her partner, for a girl it means preventing her from choosing one.8 
So are boys and girls entitled to sexual rights? What are these rights? Should they be 
regulated by the State? What role should be played by parental powers? In the case of consenting 
adults, it is considered that any intervention of the State is totally unacceptable. What other 
criteria come into play in the case of boys and girls? Where are the limits of privacy to be drawn? 
In order to respond to this series of questions, the history of the construction of the 
concept  of child will be put forth to demonstrate how sexuality is excluded. Subsequently, in 
order to argue that an adequate normative framework is necessary, an explanation will be given 
of sexual rights based on the theory of basic needs and how they are formulated in terms of 
interest theory.  To this end, legal paternalism will be briefly described as a model for the 
exercise of rights, covering the legislation currently in place and, lastly, some of the difficult 
cases or extreme cases. 
I should advise the readers that the intention of this article is simply posing a series of 
questions in order to illuminate the topic, with the understanding that it is practically impossible 
to give a definitive response to an issue involved in the evolution of Western culture over the 
past several centuries. The objective is only to justify the affirmation that an unresolved problem 
exists, one that perhaps has not even been identified in this field. 
                                                            
8 Without doubt, in many instances of child marriage the offense lies in the fact that the marriage is imposed by the 
parents, which is a violation of rights whether minors or adults are involved. However, even in cases where the girl 
consents to the marriage, international organizations recommend and feminist groups call for raising the age at 




Background: The historical construction of the exclusion of children from sexuality 
The first question which should be asked when speaking of the exclusion of a group of 
people from certain rights centers on its characteristics, meaning those that are held as the cause 
for differentiated treatment. In the case of girls and boys, there is a legal definition – those under 
the age of 18 in the majority of countries – that is sustainable in some aspects. That childhood is 
a stage of life would appear unquestionable; at most a debate could be held over the age at which 
someone is no longer a child, or if it is meaningful to distinguish between children and 
adolescents, but it is hard to imagine someone questioning what seems at first glance an obvious 
reality: children are children. 
One consequence of implicit exclusion is that it prevents us from realizing that the 
category whose attributes we claim to know is a historical construction, and inasmuch does not 
necessarily carry the properties that justify a specific treatment. This is precisely the case for 
children. The concept of child that we currently have, which seems to be the basis for exclusion, 
appeared at a relatively late period in Western history and operated, among other things, the 
separation of the child’s world from the universe of sexuality. In the second half of the 20th 
century, the history of childhood revealed to us the ways in which the concept of child was 
constructed and the implications this phenomenon had. 
According to researchers, the generalization of the modern concept of child, or what 
Phillipe Ariès9 identified as the affirmation of the modern sentiment of childhood, did not fully 
occur until the 18th century. Before then, when the child shared spaces and activities with the 
adult it was not considered reprehensible. Ariès bases his affirmation on pictorial representations 
                                                            
9 There are many authors who explain the rise of the modern concept of childhood using different theories. Phillipe 




from each time period in which children are characterized as miniature adults and lack the 
proportions and attitudes pertaining to their age. One event that, according to the author, marks 
the beginning of the process is the appearance in paintings from the 16th century of the outfit for 
children; that is, clothing appropriate for the characteristic activities that we now understand as 
proper for people during childhood, especially those involving play and games. 
For many centuries, some practices that we now consider unacceptable were 
commonplace, such as certain ways of caressing children that only stopped when they entered 
puberty. In the 15th century a movement headed by Juan Gerson (1363 – 1429) began studying 
the sexual behaviors of children with the objective of heightening people’s sentiment of guilt 
when in confession. Running counter to the customs of the time, the author proposed keeping 
childhood safe from danger by changing the way children were educated, talking to them calmly 
avoiding foul language, prohibiting them from kissing and touching each other in play, and 
avoiding an excess of contact with adults, at least in bed. These were the conceptions (together 
with those of other moralists) that eventually became dominant, although at the time they were 
not applied. The common belief at the time was that children were practically asexual beings 
until the onset of puberty (Ariès 1987, pp. 150 – 152). The image of the child Christ reflects the 
vision of childhood as the age of innocence. The subsequent centuries were decisive in the 
propagation of these ideas which resulted in the conformation of a serie of notions and practices 
related to sexuality and childhood. 
The reform of the Church in the Occident is another of the causes for the rise in interest 
in childhood, fundamentally based on the concern for education. There was a belief that people 




control these primitive instincts on an individual level while at the same time enabling political 
coexistence on a collective level (Revel 1988, pp. 173 – 182).  
The recommendations of the moralists were slow to be implemented in practice, children 
continued to be considered innocent and asexual until puberty and participated in adult activities 
from funerals, games, and poetry, to theatric productions with adult themes. 
The triumph of the educators and moralists began in the 17th century and with it came a 
new attitude regarding childhood, according to Ariès (1987, pp. 534 – 35). During this time the 
moral stance as regards certain shared activities of children and adults also changed. Some 
educators had already condemned the collective moral indifference, but it was only in the 17th 
century that general disapproval of pastimes and activities considered harmful for the education 
of children and the preservation of their morality took form (Ariès, 1987, p. 119). Ariès observes 
that this new separation of activities that are proper for children from those that are reserved for 
adults is originally carried out only in the upper classes of society, as young and old in the lower 
social strata continue participating together in the same games for some time (Ariès, 1987, p. 
142).10 
Thus began the triumph of the notion of childhood innocence that one century later would 
already be a common attitude. There is talk of the weakness and extreme ignorance of childhood, 
but in the author’s judgment, this unfavorable moral conception that stresses vulnerability 
appears as a reaction to the child’s acquisition of a protagonist role within the family. The 
sentiment of purity leads to a dualistic moral attitude towards childhood, as on one side an effort 
is made to preserve the child from corruption (especially sexual) while on the other there are 
                                                            
10 This situation also corresponds with the process of individualization: the person becoming aware of the 




efforts to strengthen it by developing character and the use of reason, for which end educators 
recommend tempering excessive affections and dedicate themselves to designing an entire array 
of behavioral norms in line with their sense of decorum.11 This ethical transformation was 
intensely promoted by the State and the Church, who begin to take over education with the 
objective of providing instruction and guaranteeing respect for the new morality by means of 
new institutional structures – grammar schools – that spread rapidly. Parents welcome them 
warmly since they feel themselves lacking the ability to successfully achieve the educative 
mission alone or the preparation to match the knowledge that the school could pass on. 
The 18th century can be considered, according to many authors, the century of the 
moralists, as it is during this period that the perception of childhood that they forwarded is 
consolidated and that the recommendations of the pedagogues are implemented into practice. 
The new role the child assumes in the home and in society prompts a series of recommendations 
for rigor and discipline meant to control it. With this new attitude the characteristics and needs 
that are specific to each child and to each stage of development become evident, such that the 
grammar schools begin separating the students by age groups. 
At the outset of the 19th century, two opposing attitudes towards childhood coexist: that 
of those who believed that children were by nature bad making it necessary to bow their will 
using suffering and those who thought (as did the followers of Rousseau) that children were born 
good but with capabilities that had to be developed. Figures completely dedicated to the study 
and work of childhood began to appear: Pestalozzi, Fröbel, Unamuno, Carderera (Delgado 1998, 
                                                            
11 Parents, whom nature has wisely disposed to love their children, are led to, if reason does not temper the great 
strength of their affection, allow their love to naturally degenerate into blind tenderness. They love their children, as 
is their duty; yet frequently, they love their personal defects. They say one should not upset children (Locke [1693] 




pp. 161 – 84). It is in this century that the systematic study of child psychology is born. In the 
legal domain, the great changes produced in the 18th century largely influence how children are 
considered. The idea begins to emerge of the State’s obligation to protect the child and as the 
educational system expands mandatory scholarization and diverse public sanitary services are 
introduced. Meanwhile, as a consequence of industrialization, the first social laws with respect to 
children are enacted in 1841 to limit work in factories. 
Once the rights to freedom are consolidated as subject to immunity in the private sphere 
of the male-adult-landowner the family belongs to, however, the child, considered a vulnerable 
and incapable being, holds rights that are derived from the civil liberties of the father and is 
therefore subject to his power and outside the reach of the law. At this point, law goes no further 
than offering protection within the limits permitted by the inviolable space of the family and thus 
only addresses children that for some reason fall outside it: the poor, the orphans, and 
delinquents.  
A historical examination of how childhood has been treated reveals ambiguity with 
regards the sexuality of children, along with oscillatory swings that probably coexisted (and 
continue to coexist) in the same time period: from considering children to be asexual being and 
thus incapable of experiencing feelings associated with sexuality, to attempting to reduce 
physical contact because of the innate predisposition for evil of every human being. All of which 
is tied to the creation of guilty feeling. 
The “discovery” of childhood brought about its segregation from the adult world and an 
increasingly radical divorce with respect to the practices of adult sexuality. Schools are to a 




idea. Childhood and sexuality are thus positioned as antagonistic concepts that must be kept 
apart. This ambiguity continues to prevail in our times, a proof of which is the attitude towards 
sexual rights, the lack of explicit recognition of those rights, and the debates surrounding themes 
such as sex education in which boys and girls – of course – do not participate.  
This ambivalence continues through the phase of adolescence, although recently there 
have been reclamations from persons from this age group for access to reproductive rights. The 
arguments rest on a series of interpretations derived from international instruments and local 
laws. The problem is that the same norms could be validly employed to justify the opposite 
argument, that is, to justify from certain perspectives strict limitation in the exercise of these 
rights. The most paradigmatic case involves the invocation of a conception which can apparently 
carry any interpretation: the best interest of the child. Yet, as we will try to show further on, 
these attempts to detach a range of rights using vague norms and principles, long from 
contributing to the a balanced formation of a normative framework, emphasize the discretional 
character of the laws regulating childhood and adolescence and submit the exercise of rights to 
the mercy of those in charge. Without doubt, this has been the distinctive mark of the legal 
treatment of childhood and adolescence. 
4. Sexual needs during childhood and adolescence 
The next step in this line of argumentation consists of determining what the sexuality of 
children and adolescents is. One interesting approach is provided by the perspective that sees 
basic needs12 as the foundation of the rights.13 Ochaíta and Espinosa have devised a system of 
                                                            
12 Using needs as a foundation for rights has been extensively developed by several authors. Some of the more 
relevant examples are Marx, Maslow, Max Neef, Rawls, Doyal and Gough, De Lucas and Añón, Hierro, Garzón 




classification based on the proposal of Doyal and Gough to identify physical health and 
autonomy as basic needs. Starting with this distinction the authors derive a series of secondary 
needs that are universal but become manifest in different ways at each stage of development.14 
Physical Health Autonomy 
。Adequate nourishment 
。Adequate lodging 
。Adequate clothing and hygiene 
。Healthcare 
。Sleep and rest 
。Adequate exterior space 
。Physical exercise 
。Safety from risk of physical  
       harm 
。Active participation and stable 
        norms 
。Primary emotional bonding 
。Interaction with adults 
。Interaction with peers 
。Formal education 
。Informal education 
。Play and leisure time 
。Safety from risk of  
        psychological harm 
Sexual needs15 
 
As can be observed, sexual needs equally involve basic needs for autonomy and for 
physical health and, although present throughout one’s life, manifest themselves differently in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
13 The existence of needs does not by itself justify their translation into rights; so the link between the two must be 
demonstrated. This argumentative bridge can be made by considering interest theories as the origin of subjective 
rights. Interest theory holds that rights are legally protected interests, so that the identification of an interest is a valid 
reason for the creation of a legal norm. Needs thus operate as interests and provide the foundation for human rights. 
Because of space limitations it is not possible to cover the complete argument in this text (González Contró, 2008). 
14 The separation and classification of primary satisfiers and secondary needs follows an effort to simplify matters 
since they function as an integrated whole and satisfiers, needs, individual characteristics and cultural context all 
interact in a complex system. It must be made clear that the division into stages does not imply accepting critical 
periods of development (which would result in fragmentation), since the process is unique in every human being and 
occurs gradually over time. The division stems from an attempt to make it easier to understand the transformations 
that occur in childhood and the generic characteristics of each developmental period. 




each period. What follows is a brief exposition of the forms these needs take in each 
developmental stage and the necessary legal protections: 
Early childhood (from a child’s first month until approximately two years of age) During 
the first years of human life – starting at five months – babies begin to explore their body and 
engage in self-stimulating behavior. Adults should accept such behavior as natural and protect 
the child from potential sexual abuse (Ochaíta and Espinosa 2004, p. 271). 
Pre-school age (from two to six years of age) During this period many concrete aspects 
of sexual needs appear; children learn to distinguish between the sexes and demonstrate certain 
behavior such as self-exploring, self-stimulating, curiosity towards companions of the opposite 
sex, etc. They also demonstrate interest in aspects related to sexuality, and their questions should 
be answered truthfully on a level appropriate for their age. It is also at this time that children 
discover their gender identity and the stereotypical roles that correspond to their sex. In this 
sense it is important to respect the child’s right to develop their gender identity, even though it 
might seem to adults that this representation does not correspond to the way roles are assigned 
within the family. The influence of communication media in constructing the meaning of being a 
man or a woman should not be underestimated (Ochaíta and Espinosa 2004, pp. 286 – 288). 
Primary school age (from six years of age until puberty, whose onset generally begins at 
twelve or thirteen years of age) As regards sexual needs, children in this stage undertake the 
construction of an image of their sexual and gender identities  and the stereotypes so rigidly 
defined in the prior stage undergo some loosening. Children in this stage can understand that 
sexual and gender identities remain constant throughout life and do not depend on external 




this process is fundamental because they furnish the principal references for children learning the 
most essential and significant elements of sexual behavior (Ochaíta and Espinosa 2004, pp. 299 – 
300). It is also important that they receive an adequate sexual education in terms of emotional 
training and personal awareness as a fundamental element of identity. 
Puberty and adolescence16 (from puberty until eighteen years of age) Sexual needs begin 
taking on great relevance, as reaching sexual maturity means the young people are able to 
perform sexual intercourse, which makes it necessary to pay special attention to sexual education 
and the prevention of pregnancy and illnesses. Affective-sexual education should address, among 
other things, the bond with the other, responsibility and self-awareness in order to work out a life 
project in which sexuality is an essential component (Ochaíta and Espinosa 2004, p. 316). 
As is easily seen, what is proposed is a broader conceptualization of sexuality. The use of 
a restricted definition has resulted in the limitations of rights associated with it. The proposal to 
consider sexuality as a fundamental component of human beings that is integrated by a series of 
related elements permits a better understanding of its relevance throughout the entire human 
lifespan and the different ways sexual rights are manifested and exercised. Without doubt, this 
would require the establishment of regulation to protect those rights that would in turn imply 
restricting other rights (especially those linked to parental powers), which does not seem likely to 
occur soon given the deep-rooted culture of the relationship between parents and children. Added 
to this is the consolidation of a liberal paradigm of rights entitlement, whose exercise is based on 
a certain type of autonomy that girls and boys presumably lack. 
                                                            
16 Adolescence was the last stage of childhood to appear in history and presents significant variations relative to 
cultural context, given the phenomenon observable in many industrialized countries in which this stage tends to 




5. Legal paternalism and child rights 
In order to better understand the difficulties that are introduced with respect to sexual 
rights, a brief description of legal paternalism as model of intervention in the exercise of rights 
will be given. Observable within this theme are also the differences in the ways interference in 
personal decisions is interpreted when it is a question of girls and boys. While it is considered 
unacceptable for adults, in general terms intromission into private life is considered reasonable 
when dealing with minors when it is a question of actions meant to protect the minor, and in fact 
this is the form that the majority of their rights takes. Put another way, children’s rights are in 
general mandatory rights17, meaning they can’t be renounced by the bearer. 
In this way legal paternalism18 justifies the exercise of rights in childhood and 
adolescence by means of two fundamental mechanisms: the first can be summarized by the 
responsibilities linked to parental power by recognizing the parents’ capacity to decide what is 
best for their children, and the second takes form through impositions determined directly by the 
state that do not leave any degree of choice, not even to the parents, with respect to the 
enforcement of the rights. In a well-balanced system another fundamental actor in the decision-
making process involving the life of a child would have to be the child him or herself. 
Paternalism is based on the premise that individuals are capable of making the wrong 
decisions with respect to their best interest, which justifies the imposition of measures by the 
authorities to preserve goods and practices commonly considered valuable. The same term is 
                                                            
17 Feinberg distinguishes between mandatory rights and discretionary rights (Feinberg 1980). 
18 The other two models of state intervention are liberationism and moral perfectionism. The former proposes 
identifying total autonomy as the means of ending the oppression of children while the latter is exemplified by the 
state in which models and ideals for living based on personal excellence are imposed. Neither are considered wholly 
justified, as liberationism neglects certain characteristics of childhood which leads it to justify some protective 
measures that go against the child’s decisions, while at the other extreme, in moral perfectionism no possibility of 




often employed with a strongly pejorative connotation to decry some types of state intervention 
into the private lives of individuals.  Many politicians and laws are discredited as being 
paternalistic in cases where the state is seen as trying to treat us like children. These cases are 
evidence in and of themselves of how far the conceptualization of children extends socially and 
its strong repercussions in the legal and political spheres. 
Paternalism is generally associated with the imposition of measures by the State designed 
to prevent individuals from hurting themselves or their interests.19 To this end the public 
authority prescribes certain behaviors or courses of action for people that are likely to contribute 
to achieving the preferences and plans in life that they themselves have freely determined, thus 
protecting the subject from acts and or omissions that affect their self-interest or the conditions 
that subtend it, even when in opposition to their will, that is, whether or not they consent. 
Examples of paternalist measures are the mandatory use of seatbelts in automobiles and helmets 
on motorcycles, mandatory schooling, the criminalization of the sale of drugs, mandatory 
pension payments, and the ban on the sale of medicine without prescription. 
In the case of girls and boys, the exercise of rights implies another paternalist 
intervention. This is reflected in the fact that compliance is not left to the will of the bearer. For 
example, the right to education is interpreted as a mandatory right, that is, although it is 
considered a right in that it represents an interest of the boy or girl that is legally protected, it is 
not a right that implicitly carry a presumption of the capability for renouncement as most rights 
                                                            
19 Feinberg considers the second case, that is, the protection of the person’s interests, constitutes an “extreme” 
version of paternalism: “The principle of legal paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-




do for adults.20 It is thus understood that it is the parent who, before all others, must see that the 
requirement of the mandatory right is met, and if they do not,  the subsidiary action of the state 
would be warranted.21 In this case not even the parents may decide whether or not the right is to 
be exercised so, put otherwise, it is also mandatory for adults. 
What happens, then, when sexual and reproductive rights are understood as freedoms? Is 
it necessary to recognize parental rights? What are the limits of paternalism? 
6. The context of sexual rights in international law and Mexican legislation 
One of the characteristics of how childhood and adolescence have been legally treated is 
the great degree of discretion awarded to the adult actors; parents, teachers, judges, authorities, 
etc. Rights related to parenthood, specifically parental powers, are a clear example. Whoever 
exercises these powers is attributed a group of rights and responsibilities for them to exercise and 
fulfill in accordance with their criteria.22 Although current trends demonstrate a reduction in 
discretionary powers as rights are more clearly formulated, the conceptualization that children 
are virtually the property of their parents is still dominant.23 The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1989, makes 
absolutely no mention to rights related to sexual needs. The explanation appears simple given the 
nature of the instrument, which required the approval of practically every country in the world. 
The Convention is one more proof of the silence surrounding the theme when girls and boys are 
concerned. The only expressed allusion is the right to protections against any form of sexual 
                                                            
20 The “most” refers to the fact that, as observed by Hierro, there are cases in which adults are denied the right to 
renounce their access to the right in question. 
21 The text of Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution clearly defines the roles of parent and state as paternalist agents. 
22 A clear example of this is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which establishes in Section 3 of 
Article 26: Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
23 Civil law is not the only domain characterized by arbitrariness. Criminal law was also characterized by the lack of 




abuse or exploitation.24 Similarly, the Facultative Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on child trafficking, children’s prostitution and children’s pornography was also approved, 
but just as in the Convention, its only concern is the prevention of the most extreme forms of 
violations of rights associated with sexual needs. Fundamental questions in addition to those 
already outlined, such as the age of consent for sexual intercourse, the freedom of access to 
contraception, or the right to respect no matter one’s sexual orientation or preference, are not 
even mentioned. They are left to the judgment of each state, where in most cases there is also a 
lack of clear regulation. It is implicitly understood that the final decision is left to the parents in 
the absence of a clear legal framework. 
This is a serious problem because it fails to provide any protection for an extremely 
vulnerable group of people, even more so when the child or adolescent concerned is also a 
woman. In this situation, in cultures whose respect for rights is dubious, many cultural practices 
are justified such as mandatory head or face cover25 or child marriage, and even practices more 
notoriously abusive of more fundamental rights such as the one referred to as “female 
circumcision.”26  
                                                            
24 Article 19. 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures 
to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other 
person who has the care of the child. 
Article 34. States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For 
these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures 
to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative 
use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of children in 
pornographic performances and materials.  
25 There different variations of the veil: hijab is a veil that covers the head; khimar is a veil which reaches to the 
waist yet leaves the face uncovered; the chador which covers the entire body except the face; the niqab which 
covers all of the face except the eyes; and the burka which covers both the face and the entire body with a screen 
over the eyes that permits limited vision. 
26 For Freeman the so-called “female circumcision” is a euphemism of male circumcision that possesses absolutely 




In traditionally liberal countries, another characteristic stemming from the demands for 
sexual and reproductive rights is the emergence of a schizophrenic system for adolescents’ rights. 
In Mexico City, for example, an adolescent can give consent in order to have an abortion 
performed on her, but not in order to have her appendix removed much less any right to political 
participation, which are reserved for adults. Just as in international law, clear regulation on the 
limits of the rights and their exercise is lacking. In the best of cases these definition have been 
delegated to secondary legislation, many of which lack democratic legitimacy because of their 
origin in regulations handed down by the executive power.27 This occurs despite the fact that 
Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution recognizes the right of all people to make free and 
informed choices regarding how many and how frequently to have children. As in the majority of 
cases, however, this is not understood as applying to minors. 
The federal character of the Mexican State also results in a greater ambiguity regarding 
adolescents since some states expressly recognize certain rights – very much reduced – related to 
the exercise of sexuality and education on the matter, while others lack regulation. 
7. The extreme cases under debate 
Besides the obvious difficulty of formulating the sexual rights of girls and boys that is 
derived from their status as minors and incapacity to give consent, there are even more complex 
cases. With a view to generate debate, a discussion follows of extreme cases in which, as they 
concern children and rights related to sexuality, no general agreement on intervention or on the 
limits to the exercise of those rights exists. The questions that serve as the connecting thread are: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
ritual, sunna, clitoridectomy and infabulation, each with a different set of physical and psychological consequences 
for the girl (Freeman 1997, p. 142). 




Who is entitled to the right? Who is authorized to exercise the right, with the understanding that 
it is a question of freedom of choice? What happens to consent? 
。Intersexual children. Intersexual children are born with ambiguous (hermaphrodite) 
genitals making it necessary to assign a sex. This decision is a prerequisite for the birth 
certificate and civil registry. The procedure for deciding the sex is based on a medical exam 
which identifies which sex is more viable, but parental consent is required. 
。Pederasty, estupro, and child prostitution. This grouping is directly tied to the issue of 
consent. Starting at what age should consent be recognized? Should an adolescent be able to 
practice prostitution by consent? Is there really a such thing as child prostitution. 
Regarding consent, one argument used in contrario sensu is the categorization of 
statutory rape in such a way that consent stands as an implicit right despite the essential nature of 
criminal law. The fact that these instances do not follow the typical categories does not mean the 
acts are legally permitted. The decision could be either politically motivated or result from the 
conclusion that the legal matter at heart does not fall under the jurisdiction of criminal law but 
rather under that of some other type of normativity. 
Experts observe that, not only for adolescents but rather at every stage of development, 
an important factor is the difference in age between the parties. In other words, a relationship 
between individuals who are two are three years apart in age cannot compare to one where the 
individuals are ten, twenty, or fifty years apart. During infancy and primary school-age this is a 




。Marriage involving children.28 Some international instruments (organs) suggest that an 
age should be fixed below which marriage cannot be contracted. Often the same groups who 
argue that the minimum age for marriage should be raised also mobilize for the recognition of 
reproductive rights for adolescents. On what basis may an adolescent’s consent to have sexual 
relations be respected, but not to marry? What does this mean for the principle of progressive 
autonomy proposed in the Convention on the Rights of the Child? 
。The right to identity of the child vs. the right to confidentiality of the donor in cases of 
assisted reproduction. Mexican legislation prohibits paternity tests in cases of married women 
whose husbands had not been unknown before the child. In the context of Mexican society 
decades ago, this regulation is understandable, as it was impossible then to establish paternity 
with certainty. Today this is possible, but in addition a series of rights have been recognized that 
are linked to technological development, such as the right to identity, that may have 
consequences on the right to health. This is made more serious by the fact that the woman who 
gives birth to a child is no longer necessarily the woman who provides the genetic material. 
What happens to this right in cases where one of the children’s parents is an anonymous donor? 
Which right prevails? How are serious situations such as marriage between relatives to be 
avoided? Is there a way to justify differentiated treatment between “naturally” conceived 
children and assisted conception when it comes to the obligation to provide nourishment?  
                                                            
28 One year ago, the international press was stirred by the news of a divorce between a Yemeni girl of 8 years whom 
her father had forced to marry a man 28 years older than her. This was not the case in another instance also covered 
by the news media in 2009, this time in Unayzah, Saudi Arabia, where a tribunal denied the petition for divorce 
made by the mother of another 8 year-old girl married to a 58 year-old man. In this case the couple did not live 




8. A few approximations in guise of a conclusion 
The first conclusion that jumps to mind is the necessity of clearly and adequately defining 
sexual and reproductive rights in terms of basic needs. Defining them this way would go far in 
reducing the degree of arbitrariness left to paternalist agents, to the benefit of the higher interests 
of the child. 
The enormous difficulty implied by the task of translating sexual needs into rights, given 
their nature, characteristics, and the stage of life in which they appear, does not pass unnoticed. 
What is needed, however, is finding formulas to protect this aspect of life for people who are in a 
state of vulnerability. Of course, this mainly implies a cultural transformation of how childhood, 
sexuality, and the relationship between children and parents are conceptualized. 
The second conclusion is that we must recognize the general tendency to concede 
adolescents’ right to consent to have sexual relationships, due to the fact that they are old enough 
to reproduce. This affirmation, however, must be linked to the theme of consent – which is 
present at every phase of life – in such a way to establish a criterion to prevent abuse. Moreover, 
this implies addressing the topic of autonomy in the exercise of rights from a holistic perspective 
based on an awareness of the development of different capacities for decision. It means taking 
rights seriously. 
Meanwhile, looking at the rights of girls and boys leads us to an interrogation of the 
character of human rights themselves. We can either hold that human rights are not universal and 
accept the consequences that this affirmation would imply and that would justify any exclusion, 
or we can conclude that sexual and reproductive rights, understood in a strict sense, are not in 




much broader than that based on rights, and because it forces a redefinition of existing rights in 
such a way that everyone be entitled to them. 
Lastly, we affirm that, if the domain of sexuality in the extensive sense of the term is 
fundamental to the development of the individual, then it is necessary to create an adequate 
normative context that guarantees these rights. This also implies protecting against related risks, 
for which the most effective means is educating girls and boys how to protect themselves. This 
requires both recognizing and knowing what the needs are: 
In this way alone can we instill in our boys and girls an “erotiphile” attitude that will 
allow them to fully develop as individuals and, at the same time, arm them with strategies and 
resources protect themselves from certain risks and forms of abuse (Ochaíta and Espinosa 2004, 
p. 253). 
In the end, what this is about is a group of topics that need to be discussed. The 
arguments regarding the rights of girls, boys, and adolescents began with the premises of the 
irrelevance of the will in the exercise of rights and of the exclusion from entitlement. A new 
discussion needs to begin with an interrogation of these suppositions, one that above all includes 
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